Startup Struggles Rewriting Apps and Finding Users

Startup "Fixr" aimed to connect car owners with mechanics.
The founding team consisted of a CFO (innovation manager), CMO (legal associate), and COO (mechanic).
Fixr had been operating for almost 3 years, with limited tangible progress.
They had secured a personal bank loan for funding, won a local pitch contest, and secured a SEIS scheme registration.
Extensive market research showed mechanics were interested in joining the platform upon launch.
They developed a financial model projecting significant revenue growth with seed funding.
They had a static landing page and 4 apps (customer/mechanic, iOS/Android) that were mostly built.
Previous development work by overseas contractors for 2 years resulted in apps that were not production-ready, with issues like outdated screen dimensions and incomplete integrations.
The author was brought in as an advisor due to his mobile app expertise.
Communication with the development agency involved significant resistance and "gaslighting" regarding bug fixes and scope.
The author suggested a full rewrite of the apps due to the state of the existing code.
Demonstrating a quick prototype, the author convinced the co-founders to pursue a rewrite, leading to him being provisionally appointed as cofounder and CTO.
An Android developer, Gus, was also brought on board.
Original equity contracts had a "spicy clause" allowing the management team to unilaterally reduce or remove developer equity based on performance, which was later amended to "gross negligence" after legal advice.
Gus and the author rewrote the apps during the COVID-19 lockdown, building a functional MVP with core features for posting jobs, payment, inspections, and invoicing.
Despite the functional MVP, the co-founders continuously pushed to expand the scope with more features (roadside recovery, MOT checks, etc.).
The author and Gus pushed back, advocating for launch rather than further development.
The apps were released but received "crickets" (zero users, zero revenue, zero funding).
The lack of users revealed deeper issues beyond product development.
The co-founders had internal conflict (Jimmy vs. Mike), requiring mediation.
Equity reallocation was reportedly capricious, with the author and Gus protected by their contract.
The author attempted to bootstrap the marketplace by recruiting mechanics and running social media ads.
A meeting with a CTO from a large UK car recovery company occurred, but the Fixr team lacked traction data (zero sign-ups, zero jobs) and the CFO oddly focused on a referral banking partnership.
The author realized they were doing significant unpaid work.
The author left Fixr after being offered a co-founder position at a different startup, Carbn, which showed more promising signs (bootstrapping founder, validated market niche, funded design work, clear equity process).
Gus also left Fixr.
Fixr dissolved after the developers left, highlighting the reliance on their work.
The author reflects that despite the negative aspects, he "loved every minute of it" because he was actively building and involved in all aspects of the startup.
The experience, though exploitative, provided valuable learned lessons that uniquely qualified him for the role at Carbn.
The author suggests that a difficult startup journey can be beneficial for early-career professionals.
Red flags identified include: long operation without launch, equity tied to personal loans, co-founder infighting, unclear roles/contributions of co-founders, inefficient technical decisions (e.g., building multiple native apps prematurely), placing too much value on pitch competitions over user validation, lack of in-person interaction, the difficulty of marketplace startups (especially with infrequent/expensive transactions), vague responses from VCs about traction, and not being thoroughly vetted as a sign they are desperate for free labor.